



basic education

Department:
Basic Education
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

**NATIONAL
SENIOR CERTIFICATE**

GRADE 12

**HISTORY P1
FEBRUARY/MARCH 2014
ADDENDUM**

This addendum consists of 13 pages.

QUESTION 1: HOW DID THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS INTENSIFY COLD WAR TENSIONS BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE USA IN THE 1960s?**SOURCE 1A**

The following extract outlines the USSR president, Nikita Khrushchev's reasons for sending missiles to Cuba.

During a vacation on the Black Sea in April, Khrushchev suddenly realised a way to solve his international problems. His plan would make the world think the Soviet Union was the nuclear equal of the United States while providing time to produce enough missiles to balance the US arsenal (weapons collection). Thinking of American nuclear missiles pointing at him from NATO member Turkey, across the Black Sea, Khrushchev decided to station similar missiles in Cuba. Nuclear missiles in Cuba would not only keep the United States from attacking the communist island but would teach the Americans what it was like to be surrounded by close-range enemy nuclear weapons.

'Why shouldn't the Soviet Union have the right to do the same as America?' Khrushchev said to his aides. It was an appealing plan and the Soviet leader moved quickly to implement it. Khrushchev decided it was essential to keep the project completely secret. When Cuba was fully armed it would be too late for the United States to react. There were dissenters (rebels) in the Soviet government. Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko told Khrushchev, 'Putting our nuclear missiles in Cuba would cause a political explosion in the United States.' Khrushchev did not listen. Certain of success, he refused to consider alternate plans of action if the US discovered the missiles before they were fully operational.

[From: *Thirteen Days/Nines Miles, The Cuban Missile Crisis, 2000* by N Finkelstein]

SOURCE 1B

This source comprises a visual source and a written source on America's response to the building of missile sites in Cuba by the USSR.

Visual Source: These are newspaper headlines that appeared around the world on 23 October 1962. It was after president Kennedy imposed a blockade on Soviet missiles that were entering Cuba.



New York Mirror
**WE BLOCKADE
CUBA WITH 40
WARSHIPS**

The New York Times
**U.S. IMPOSES ARMS
BLOCKADE ON CUBA
ON FINDING OFFENSIVE-
MISSILE SITES; KENNEDY
READY FOR SOVIET
SHOWDOWN**

DAILY NEWS
**WE BLOCKADE
CUBA ARMS**

The Written Source follows on the next page.

Written Source: This extract focuses on the uncertainty and fear that Americans felt about the Cuban Missile Crisis.

The days of the crisis were the scariest many people had ever lived through. Grocery store shelves were swept clean, as people stocked up on food and other things needed to survive in case the bombs fell. Government civil-defence activities included daily air-raid drills in schools and elsewhere, teaching children and adults how to 'duck and cover' in case of a nuclear blast. Every evening of the week after president Kennedy's speech, people watched Walter Cronkite, the legendary (famous) CBS anchor man and the voice of nightly news for generations of Americans. Audiences watched live coverage as the Soviet ships came to the quarantine line. Cronkite wondered along with his viewers what was going to happen out at sea, as the blockade continued. The threat of war seemed closer than ever.

Former New Jersey Senator Robert Torricelli remembered: 'The Cuban Missile Crisis was one of the most vivid experiences in my life. Watching the television and waiting for the reports of whether the Russian freighter was going to reverse course. Going to the supermarket with my parents, and they carried that list from the newspaper of the things you needed to have in the basement if there was a nuclear war. Then my parents set up a battery radio and cots and sleeping bags in the basement, things to store water and a lot of canned food. I think some of it stayed there until we sold the house in 1986. During the crisis, many people went to bed wondering whether they would live to see the next sunrise. However, as scared as many people were as they watched the crisis unfold, most of them probably did not know just how close the world was to a nuclear nightmare.'

[From: *The Cuban Missile Crisis To The Brink Of War* by P Byrne]

SOURCE 1C

The following extract is a response by president Kennedy to president Khrushchev's letter dated 27 October 1962.

I have read your letter of October 26th with great care and welcome the statement of your desire to seek a prompt solution to the problem. The first things that need to be done, however, is for work to cease on offensive missile bases in Cuba and for all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use to be rendered inoperable (unworkable), under effective United Nations arrangements.

... the first ingredient, let me emphasise, is the cessation (end) of work on missile sites in Cuba and measures to render such weapons inoperable (unworkable), under effective international guarantees. The continuation of this threat, or a prolonging of this discussion concerning Cuba by linking these problems to the broader questions of European and world security, would surely lead to an intensified situation on the Cuban crisis and a grave risk to the peace of the world. For this reason I hope we can quickly agree ...

John F Kennedy

[From: *Thirteen Days A Memoir Of The Cuban Missile Crisis* by R Kennedy]

QUESTION 2: DID JULIUS NYERERE'S POLICY OF UJAMAA TRANSFORM TANZANIA IN THE 1960s?**SOURCE 2A**

The source below consists of a written and a visual source.


Written source: The following is part of Julius Nyerere's address to the National Assembly of Tanzania, 6 July 1970. It focuses on his policy of ujamaa.

The Arusha Declaration was and is a statement about both politics and economics. These two aspects are equally important and cannot be separated from each other. For the Declaration is about the way in which we shall make a reality of human equality in this country, and how our citizens will achieve full control over their own affairs.

Since the Arusha Declaration three years ago, our practical emphasis has been on the necessities for public ownership and control over the economy. It was this aspect which required immediate action because it involved considerable changes in the institutions which existed before 1967. But the nationalisation of the banks, of commerce, of food manufacturing plants and of the wholesale export and import trade, only makes the country socialist if the nation is governed by the people themselves through their freely elected representatives.

[From: *Arusha Declaration Parliament* by J Nyerere]

Visual source: This is a photograph of Julius Nyerere which appeared on the cover of *Time* magazine, 13 March 1964.



TANGANYIKA'S
PRESIDENT
NYERERE

[From: <http://www.time.com/time/covers/0.16641,19640313,00.html>. Accessed on 15 January 2013]

SOURCE 2B

This article by M Howe appeared in *The New York Times* on 5 October 1970 and is titled 'Tanzanian self-help villages crowded'.

Ever since independence in December 1961, president Julius Nyerere has tried to bridge the economic and social gap between the urban minorities and the vast rural majority. His views on rural development were published in April 1962 in an essay, 'Ujamaa – the basis of African Socialism'.

His government made various attempts to begin to regroup the rural population into villages to facilitate the introduction of technical progress and modern necessities such as potable water, electricity, schools and clinics.

The main impetus (motivation) for the program came in 1967, when the government party adopted a policy of socialism based on hard work, self-reliance and the development of agriculture. There are said to be some 1,5 million small private farmers on scattered holdings who in most cases continue to work along traditional lines.

The government and the party have waged an aggressive campaign to spread the ujamaa spirit. 'Prosperity through a co-operative life' is the slogan at public meetings. Numerous incentives have been put at the disposal of ujamaa villages: land-bank, credit, veterinary services, free seeds and fertiliser. The movement seems to have caught on, and every day some group announces that it has created a village.

[From: *The New York Times*, 5 October 1970]

SOURCE 2C

This source focuses on the failure of the policy of ujamaa.

But the policy was not successful in economic terms for a number of reasons. The majority of the people did not want to work on communal farms because they had traditionally worked on their own farms owned by themselves or by individual families. The people did not work hard in ujamaa villages as much as they did on their own farms because they did not feel that the farms belonged to them but to the community. There were no incentives to production in ujamaa villages one would expect to have when working on one's own farm.

As long as they did not get profit for themselves from their labour investments, they were not going to work hard. In fact, millions resented being resettled in ujamaa villages and there were violent confrontations with the authorities in many cases when people refused to be moved into those settlements.

The government finally realised that the policy was not working. But it was too late by then. Agriculture had virtually come to a standstill. As Nyerere said, in retrospect (on reflection): 'You can't socialise what is not traditional. The shamba (farm) can't be socialised.'

[From: *Tanzania Under Mwalimu Nyerere* by G Mwakikagile]

QUESTION 3: HOW DID THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT CHALLENGE THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IN THE 1960s?**SOURCE 3A**

This source outlines the non-violence philosophy that the Civil Rights Movement used in the USA in the 1960s.

... the Civil Rights Movement chose the tactic of non-violence as a tool to dismantle (break down) institutionalised (legalised) racial segregation, discrimination and inequality. Indeed, they followed Martin Luther King Jr's guiding principles of non-violence and passive resistance. Civil rights leaders had long understood that segregationists would go to any length to maintain their power and control over blacks. Consequently, they believed some changes might be made if enough people outside the South witnessed the violence blacks had experienced for decades.

According to Bob Moses and other civil rights activists, they hoped and often prayed that television and newspaper reporters would show the world that the primary reason blacks remained in such a subordinate position in the South was because of widespread violence directed against them. History shows there was no shortage of violence to attract the media.

[From: <http://www.mshistorynow.mdah.state.ms.us/articles/>. Accessed on 15 January 2013]

SOURCE 3B

This source focuses on the sit-ins that civil rights activists adopted in the USA during the 1960s.

The basic plan of the sit-ins was that a group of students would go to a lunch counter and ask to be served. If they were, they'd move on to the next lunch counter. If they were not, they would not move until they had been. If they were arrested, a new group would take their place. The students always remained non-violent and respectful. Students in Nashville had some 'Do's' and 'Don'ts' during sit-ins:

Do show yourself friendly on the counter at all times. Do sit straight and always face the counter. Don't strike back, or curse back if attacked. Don't laugh out. Don't hold conversations. Don't block entrances.

... This first sit-in had very little effect. CL Harris, manager of the store, said of the students, 'They can just sit there. It's nothing to me'. But when a larger group of students returned the next day, wire services picked up the story, and civil rights organisations began to spread the word to other college campuses. Gordon Carey, a representative from the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), came down from New York to organise more sit-ins. Ella Baker of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) contacted students on many college campuses. In two weeks, students in eleven cities held sit-ins, primarily at Woolworths' and SH Kress stores. Soon stores put signs in the window, saying 'NO TRESPASSING', 'We Reserve the Right to Service the Public As We See Fit' and 'CLOSED – In the Interest of Public Safety'.

[From: <http://www.americanhistory.about.com/od/civilrights/Civil-Rights-Movement.htm>. Accessed on 15 January 2013]

SOURCE 3C

The extract below highlights how Martin Luther King Jr fought for voting rights for African Americans in Alabama in January 1965.

On 2 January 1965, Dr King ... announced that a new, and more militant, phase of his civil rights campaign would be initiated in Selma, Alabama. From its inception, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) sought to secure both social and political rights for black Americans. On that fateful January day, King said, 'We are not asking, we are demanding the ballot.' Selma was then under the jurisdiction of sheriff James G Clark, an avid, shrewd segregationist ... Clark finally felt compelled to arrest King, along with 770 other demonstrators, on 1 February 1965. By 3 February, Clark had arrested 500 more demonstrators. On 6 March, Dr King called for a march from Selma to Montgomery in order to carry the campaign for voting rights to the steps of the state capitol.

[From: *A Testament of Hope – The Essential Writings And Speeches Of Martin Luther King, Jr.*
by JM Washington]

SOURCE 3D

This source consists of a written and a visual source on the Selma to Montgomery March.

Written Source: This source focuses on the Selma to Montgomery March on 7 March 1965.

In early 1965 he (Martin Luther King Jr) organised a march through Selma, Alabama. Only 2,4% of Selma's blacks were registered to vote and the town was notorious (infamous) for its brutally racist sheriff, Jim Clark. The authorities banned the planned march. However, on 7 March, about 600 people went ahead with the march (without King). They were brutally attacked. The media called it 'Bloody Sunday'. King tried to keep pressure on and rearranged the march. However, he compromised on 11 March by leading a token march. It turned back after a short distance.

King's compromise avoided more violence. It annoyed (angered) the more radical black activists but King's restraint (self-discipline) probably helped president Johnson to push through a Voting Rights Bill in 1965. This was finally passed by Congress and became law in 1968.

[From: *Modern World History* by B Walsh]

The Visual Source follows on the next page.

Visual Source: This is an aerial view of the civil rights activists crossing the Edmund Pettus Bridge during the march from Selma to Montgomery, Alabama on 7 March 1965.



Thousands of civil rights activists are seen crossing the Edmund Pettus Bridge.

[From: <http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/civilrights/images/cr0028s.jpg>. Accessed: 15 January 2013]

QUESTION 4: HOW DID THE PHILOSOPHY OF BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS INFLUENCE THE STUDENTS OF SOWETO IN 1976?**SOURCE 4A**

The following source comprises two extracts on the philosophy of Black Consciousness.

Extract 1: This extract focuses on the emergence of the philosophy of Black Consciousness.

Black students became dissatisfied with NUSAS and in 1969 formed an all-black student body, the South African Student Organisation (SASO). In the conditions of harsh repression (oppression) following the banning of the ANC, a vacuum had come to exist in the sphere of organised resistance to white domination. SASO, most of whose leaders and members were not familiar with the history and policies of the ANC, began to fill this vacuum (emptiness). They developed an ideology which became known as Black Consciousness.

Exponents of Black Consciousness stressed the need for psychological liberation. They said that the years of subjugation (suppression) had caused black people to lose confidence in themselves and develop feelings of inferiority. They insisted that blacks should not work in the same political, social and cultural organisations as whites. Blacks should develop their own organisations, they said, with an exclusively black leadership and membership, free from the suffocating (unbearable) influence of white liberals who tended to dominate multi-racial organisations.

[From: *Foundations Of The New South Africa* by J Pampallis]

Extract 2: This extract outlines the African National Congress's (ANC) assessment of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM).

This is a positive contribution that we must recognise and to which we must pay tribute. We should also recognise the significant input that the BCM made towards further uniting the black oppressed masses of our country, by emphasising the commonness of their oppression and their shared destiny. These views were built on political positions that our movement had long canvassed (drum up support) and fought for. Nevertheless, we must still express our appreciation of the contribution that the BCM made in this regard while recognising the limitations of this movement which saw our struggle as racial, describing the entire white population of our country as 'part of the problem'.

[From: *Foundations Of The New South Africa* by J Pampallis]

SOURCE 4B

This source consists of accounts by Murphy Morobe and Seth Mazibuko on how the philosophy of Black Consciousness influenced them.

Murphy Morobe's account: Morobe was a student at the Morris Isaacson High School in Orlando, Soweto and a prominent member of SASM and the banned ANC.

I became more conscious of the situation of black people in this country and this township. I was able to go into town, I was able to see the contrast, the differences and all that raised questions in my mind. Amongst us, we began to develop a keen sense for wanting to discover more ideas about struggles, not only in this country, but also about what happened in other areas.

There was always a list published of books that were banned and for us, it meant that whatever the government banned must be something good and it was part of our adventure as youngsters to actually go out to actively look for those books. The 1970s were not long after the major student uprisings in Europe, France, and the Civil Rights Movement and the Black Power Movement in the United States. 1974 was, of course, the year of the Portuguese defeat in Mozambique and Angola and, when that happened, I think it had a major boost on us.

[From: *Soweto A History* by P Bonner and L Segal]

Seth Mazibuko's account: Mazibuko was a student at the Phefeni High School in Orlando, Soweto. He was a prominent leader of the 1976 Soweto Student's March.

'... the concept of Black Consciousness, like "Be black and proud, close ranks and fight", "Black man, you're on your own", built something in all of us. It was able to say to us, "Stand up. Resist!" BC became a way of life. It caught up with the youth of the time. It came to cure a person who'd been in this trance (spell) of fear.'

[From: *Soweto A History* by P Bonner and L Segal]

SOURCE 4C

The following source comprises a written source and a visual source on the Soweto Uprising of 1976.


Written Source: This source outlines the reasons for the students' march to Orlando Stadium, Soweto in June 1976.

The imposition (enforcement) of Afrikaans as a medium of instruction came at an unstable time, as the 'centre of gravity' in black student politics had shifted dramatically in the mid-1970s. The emerging Black Consciousness philosophy was transforming the way young black people thought, and it boosted their self-esteem. The introduction of Afrikaans frustrated this change. According to Biko, the difficulty of coping with a foreign language in schools caused 'an inferiority complex'. He added that the language problem 'inculcates in many black students a sense of inadequacy (hopelessness). You tend to think that it is not just a matter of language. You tend to tie it up with intelligence'.

For this generation of black students, Afrikaans was the language of the police and their employers, and an instrument for giving orders. They believed that the imposition of Afrikaans was designed to train them for servitude. Afrikaans was also, as one student put it, 'a terrible academic pain'. 'The kids were failing exams in thousands,' recalled a black journalist. This was because for many years Maths, Science and other subjects were taught in English. The sudden shift to Afrikaans gave rise to difficulties in the student's understanding of jargon (language) and technical terms.

[From: *Soweto – Black Revolt White Reaction* by J Kane-Berman]

Visual Source: A photograph showing protesting students in Soweto in June 1976.



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[From: *Through My Lens: A Photographic Memoir* by A Kumalo]

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Visual sources and other historical evidence were taken from the following sources:

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